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In his new book, Ricardo Seitenfus
explains how he helped foil an attempted coup against President
René Préval, how an “electoral diktat was imposed on Haiti by
the Imperial Trident,” and how “the international community has
behaved in Haiti as if it were in conquered territory.”
(Second of two parts)*
(Part 1)
Q:
You describe a “Core
Group” who you say had decided who the next president of Haiti
would be before the elections even took place. Who is in this
Core Group, and what else can you tell us about them? What other
kinds of decisions do they make for Haiti?
Ricardo Seitenfus: On Sun., Nov. 28,
2010 [election day], when visiting a voting center in the city
of Léogane, at around 8:30 am, Mulet reiterated in interviews
with radio and TV stations that everything was going normally,
in spite of timely complaints by some voters who could not find
their names in the list of the voting station where, as they
thought, they were supposed to vote. According to Mulet, ‘In
general everything is going well, everything is peaceful. I see
a great passion of citizens and from citizens for democracy in
this country. MINUSTAH is here. There is no reason to be
frightened. It’s an electoral celebration. There are some small
administrative problems, but no big problem that is going to
reduce participation.’ [10]
Only four hours after these statements,
Mulet convened the Core Group for an urgent meeting in view of
an alleged crisis. Before the gathering started he confided in
me, with some concern, in a natural and calm way, as if what he
was about to tell me was in the order of things, that: ‘I just
finished talking on the phone with Préval informing him that an
airplane would be at his disposal to leave the country. In 48
hours, at the latest — that is, until Tuesday, the 30th [of
November 2010] — Préval will have to leave the presidency and
abandon Haiti.’
I don’t know how I managed to hide my
indignant surprise in the face of such an absurdity. I kept
calm, hiding behind a false sense of casualness, in order to
find out what had been Préval’s reaction. Mulet responded:
‘President Préval says he is not Aristide, but that he is
Salvador Allende.’ [11]
And, sounding disheartened, Mulet
concluded, in Spanish: ‘Ricardo, we are not doing very well.’
When Bellerive arrived at the meeting he
asked directly, without beating about the bush, bluntly: ‘I
would like to know whether President Préval’s mandate is on the
negotiation table? Yes or no?’
He looked across the room at his audience,
who remained in silence. A heavy and very long silence. Glances
met. It was a moment of extreme seriousness. Well beyond the
fate of the then-president, the response was going to be
decisive, both for the future of Haiti and for the integrity of
MINUSTAH.
Mulet’s words, Préval’s alleged reaction,
and the assertions by some of those present — in apparent
agreement with Préval’s departure, were all still echoing in me.
The presence of [OAS Assistant Secretary
General] Albert Ramdin — a major official in the OAS present in
the meeting — tied my hands and silenced my voice. What to do?
In the face of Bellerive’s direct question, the exalted coup
plotters of the Core Group fell silent; their words still
echoing in the room. A sense of the unusual was met by
cowardice. Yet, it was necessary to act quickly because the
first action in this tense environment would guide the debate.
To break a silence that seemed to have no
end, and convinced that I was interpreting basic principles and
not mere circumstantial interests, I took the initiative and
asked to speak. It was necessary to do so, for we were about to
commit a moral disgrace and a gross political error. With the
active and crucial participation of the international community,
we would be once again throwing Haiti toward the precipice
mentioned by the American Luigi R. Einaudi (then- Acting
Secretary General of the OAS) during the February 2004 crisis.
I did not even consider the possibility of
unpleasant consequences, both personal and professional, that
could affect me. It was the opposite. To oppose the absurdity
that was intended by the international community appeared to me
a simple obligation. A democratic conscience and the respect for
the Haitian institutions guided my attitude. It was not going to
be the OAS representative in Haiti who would speak. It would be
the Brazilian and the university professor.
Taking care to state that I was speaking on
my own behalf and not on behalf of the OAS, I told them that I
was doing this out of a duty of loyalty to colleagues. Moreover,
everyone knew the work I had done in Haiti in the preparation of
the voter registry, in conditions of great difficulty. I had
legitimacy, therefore, to speak. Essentially speaking to the
non-Americans [i.e., those not from the Americas] present who,
in theory, were not used to our political and judicial rules, I
pointed out that: ‘In 2001, in the Americas, a document entitled
the Inter-American Democratic Charter was signed. This Charter
signals that any modification to the mandate of a
democratically-elected president, outside of the constitutional
precepts, should be considered to be a putsch.’
There was silence once again. A long and
heavy silence. Before it got too long again, I looked at the
Brazilian ambassador, who had positioned himself in front of me
in this imaginary circle that we were forming, and asked: ‘I
would like to know Brazil’s position.’
Igor Kipman said immediately: ‘Brazil
shares the same interpretation.’
I was relieved, I was no longer alone. Next
in line was the Argentinian Rodolfo Matarollo, the UNASUR
representative, who made a similar statement. Looking desolate,
[then-U.S. Ambassador to Haiti] Kenneth Merten was shaking his
head, signaling his dissatisfaction with how the meeting was
unfolding. When he broke his silence it was to recognize that
the coup by the Core Group against Préval would fail and he
said: ‘We’re not going to talk about this anymore.’
After aborting the maneuver to repeat with
Préval what had been done with Aristide in February 2004, I was
confident in defending my position. Outraged by the prospect
that presented itself and still shocked and stunned by what I
was experiencing, I concluded that when it comes to Haiti, the
international community does not have limits for the actions it
takes. Legality and common sense had prevailed. Until when? My
hopes were still alive, and I did not notice that a common
international front had formed that would decide the electoral
path to be followed by Haiti.
Q: You suggest that the
press conference by the various presidential candidates —
excluding the governing party’s candidate Jude Célestin – on the
day of the election was planned beforehand. If the Core Group
already had a plan to bar a Célestin victory, why did all these
candidates take part in the press conference? Were they unaware
of the Core Group plan? Did the plan not involve any Haitian
politicians? Was the plan always to have Martelly win, or was it
simply to not let Célestin win?
RS: In my presence, the Core Group,
until the fateful meeting in Edmond Mulet’s residence on the
early afternoon of Nov. 28, 2010, had not taken any decision or
even discussed a strategy to give Martelly Haiti’s presidency.
What did happen, constantly, was an undercutting of Jude
Célestin’s candidacy. They accused him of being Préval’s
son-in-law and of being his puppet. Mulet, despite having no
evidence, said that ministers would travel to the countryside
with ‘suitcases full of money to buy votes.’
Inite’s [the party of Préval and Célestin ]
electoral campaign, being a major political party and
considering the situation, was also more visible, the most well
organized and the one with the most resources. Later, these
advantages would become disadvantages. The version of rampant
corruption was gaining credibility.
The main leader in the process of
dismantling the incumbent party’s candidacy was MINUSTAH’s chief
himself. Mulet always spoke negatively when mentioning Jude
Célestin. It was in this breeding ground that two major factors
intervened during the day of the election. On the one hand,
there was the gathering of 12 of the 18 candidates denouncing an
alleged electoral fraud and demanding the annulment of the
election. On the other, and much more decisive, were the
demonstrations — mostly peaceful — that supposedly forced the
members of the Core Group to seek refuge in their homes. In that
moment, a dilemma presented itself and the atavistic fear of
foreigners reemerged: what to do if Martelly’s youth movement
were to degenerate? Would MINUSTAH be willing to control it?
Would it have the capacity? And at what cost?
Convinced that it would be less risky to
retract itself, the Core Group decided to sacrifice the
elections. Their cowardice served as an inexhaustible source of
inspiration to throw away the hard work of thousands of
individuals to organize the elections in extreme conditions. The
logic of this strategy was to reward the main grave-diggers of
the young Haitian democracy.
In short, for the international community,
Haiti is not worth the trouble. Or better said, its recurring
crises have made us grow accustomed to act, moved by principles
that we always condemn. For someone who arrived in Haiti as a
professor of democracy, our lessons leave much to be desired.
Q: What can you tell us
about the OAS Expert Mission that intervened in Haiti’s
elections? How were these “experts” chosen? How was their
mandate to look at the results negotiated?
RS: There is little I can say since
I was no longer in Haiti. I know that Brazil, Spain, and the
European Union pressured, in vain, to place their specialists in
the OAS/CARICOM vote recount mission. The suggestion by the CEP
Advisor Ginette Chérubin proposing the formation of a Special
Verification Commission (SVC), fully independent from the
executive and formed exclusively by Haitians, [12] was not even
considered, starting with President Préval. The nationalism and
foreign non-interventionism underlying the formation of this SVC
is not an item on the agenda. It would be the foreigners, and
them exclusively, who were to define the will of the Haitian
voter.
Although the foreign technicians, hired by
the UNDP, were responsible for counting the votes, it was not
enough. It was necessary to change the result of the first
round. The only possibility was to annul the results in certain
ballot boxes that favored Célestin. That way, he would fall back
to 3rd place at the same time that the candidate anointed by the
international community would go on to participate in the second
round, along with Mirlande Manigat.
After making the decision of transforming
the OAS/CARICOM Observation Mission into a vote Recounting
Mission, it became necessary to sign an agreement to complement
and reinforce the original one. A first draft of the agreement,
written under the supervision of Albert Ramdin, OAS Deputy
Secretary — in spite of the inevitable and very harsh conditions
imposed on the Haitian electoral authorities — made explicit in
the second article, in an unprecedented manner in the annals of
the organization’s electoral cooperation, that the mission would
be formed by specialists ‘chosen by the OAS Office of the
Secretary General in consultation with the governments of
Canada, France and the United States of America.’
What to everyone should be an unacceptable
condition is an object of criticism by the European Union and
Spain. However, the reserve soldiers do not interfere with the
electoral diktat imposed on Haiti by the Imperial Trident
(Canada, the United States and France). Much to the contrary.
The claims originated in Brussels and Madrid derived from the
absence of any specific mention providing for the ex officio
presence of their supposed specialists in being part of the
new mission.
Insulza realizes that he should not allow —
formally and legally –the Recount Mission to put itself at the
exclusive service of the interests of three states, one of them
not an OAS member. He then accepts Préval’s considerations to
demand a new version of the agreement. The agreement changes in
form; never in its objectives or contents. Rewritten, the
supplementary agreement is signed on Dec. 29 by Gaillot
Dorsainvil, CEP President; by Jean-Max Bellerive and by the
Chief of the Electoral Observation Mission (EOM), Colin
Granderson.
Formed by nine individuals, two of them OAS
career officials — from the United States and Chile — it is
interesting to note the nationality of the others: there were
three citizens from the United States, two from France, one from
Canada, and one from Jamaica. The traditional powers that
control Haitian politics reserved for themselves the lion’s
share, since seven out of nine participants were nationals from
these countries.
Latin America, in turn, who aspired to play
a dominant role, returned to her historical insignificance and
was conspicuous by her absence. In effect, although Brazil tried
to include one or two ministers from the Supreme Electoral Court
in the Recount Mission, backed both by its financial
contribution to the EOM as well as by the technical expertise of
these individuals, the fact is that the OAS did not take into
account the suggestion. It is very likely that the Brazilian
presence would have made it difficult for the Imperial Trident
to attain the Mission’s political objectives.
Once the agreement was signed, there was
the challenge of making it operational. This was a complex task
since the Mission, with its new clothes and functions, was to
replace the country’s electoral authorities. Accordingly, it was
essential to maintain the appearance that the CEP’s autonomy and
independence remained unharmed. This “Corneille’s choice” [13]
was impossible to fulfill without the connivance of the CEP
advisors, who opposed the maneuver.
The Recount Mission had two objectives. On
the one hand, to get Jude Célestin out of the second round, and
on the other, to impose this as if it were legal before the
Haitian Constitution and Electoral Law.
Given that there could be no doubt about
the results of the recount, the Mission was to invent rules and
principles that were nonexistent in the Haitian electoral
regulations and entirely unknown in all other electoral systems.
We are talking about an unprecedented and innovative operation
that will remain in the annals of electoral audits. Thus, it
decided that no candidate could have more than 225 votes — even
when the average number of registered voters was 460 — in each
polling station. It was of little importance what level of local
and regional approval each candidate had.
Still unsatisfied, the Mission applied this
innovative method to the candidate Jude Célestin, dismissing
ex officio those ballot boxes in which he obtained 225 or
more votes. To maintain a good appearance, they decided,
nonetheless, to eliminate some of the votes for Mirlande Manigat
and Michel Martelly. Thus, 13,830 votes were eliminated from the
former and 7,150 from the latter, while Jude Célestin saw 38,541
votes disappear, or 60% of all the votes that were eliminated.
Although having applied a revolutionary
method, the Recount Mission, unfortunately, did not reach the
percentages needed to reverse the official results announced by
the CEP. Since it had already abandoned all qualms and
principles, the Mission decided then to reduce to 150 the cutoff
for the votes going to Célestin. Next, they extrapolated the
votes obtained in these ballot boxes to the other candidates
through simple prorating. When the reversal of Célestin’s and
Martelly’s places was accomplished, it decided it was satisfied,
and concluded the operation.
It was never a concern for the Recount
Mission to identify the existence of fraud. It did not perform
any analysis of the voting tallies, of the data transfer or of
the voters’ identity cards. It also had no interest in auditing
the results of the ballot boxes. Despite calling itself a
recount instrument, it did not perform any audit of the votes or
count of them. It simply acted until it reached its objective
and decided its work was completed. Therefore, the number of
votes obtained by each of the candidates will never be known.
Swiftly, promptly and in bad faith, on Jan.
13 the EOM, equipped with its unprecedented powers and applying
a methodology below any suspicion, decided that Mirlande Manigat
remained in first place with 31.6%, with the second place now
going to Michel Martelly (22.2%). Jude Célestin was relegated to
third place, after obtaining 21,9%. There was a slight reversion
of the percentages, enough to get rid of that candidate from
being in the second round.
The magnitude of the endeavor’s absurdity
and the flagrant weakness of the opponent, allowed for
abandoning all caution. Simply, votes were exchanged across
recipients and small percentages reversed.
Once again, the international community had
behaved in Haiti as if it were in conquered territory. It boldly
put into practice, absent any legal, technical or moral basis, a
white coup and a blatant electoral intervention.
Once its alleged recount work was over and
anticipating the official release of its recommendations to the
Haitian authorities, the results of the Recount Mission were
leaked out to the press through two international news agencies.
Coinciding with the nationality of a good portion of the alleged
experts in the Mission, the American Associated Press (AP) and
the French Agence France-Presse (AFP) were selected, agencies
which lent themselves willingly to the maneuver.
Since in this game no one is naïve, the
leaks had the clear objective of becoming accomplished facts.
Later they did.
In the 50 years of electoral cooperation
offered by the OAS to the member states, it had never dared to
adopt these procedures. It had never so evidently and
shamelessly replaced not only the electoral authorities of the
sponsoring state, but also the voters themselves.
The basic rules that guide the OAS
observation and electoral monitoring missions were violated. Its
procedures manual was not followed. As a result of the debacle
of one of the most respected instruments of the American [i.e.,
Americas] system, the Director of the OAS Department of
Electoral Cooperation, the Chilean Pablo Gutiérrez, presented
his resignation.
This episode marked the OAS with a
permanent stain and became the most regretful, though little
known, event in [OAS Secretary General] José Miguel Insulza’s
administration.
One cannot disagree with René Préval when,
faced with the ratification of the election of a candidate
imposed by the United States through the international
community, he asked himself: ‘In this case, why were elections
held?’
Q: We know from the
Wikileaks release of U.S. State Department cables that the U.S.
government sees MINUSTAH as a priority in the region, for
“managing” Haiti on the cheap. Why do you think left-leaning
South American nations such as Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and
Argentina continue to participate in it? Do you think some of
them may soon follow Uruguay’s lead and start to scale back or
pull their troops and officers completely?
RS: Not only why do these countries
continue participating in MINUSTAH, but most of all, why, in
2004, did they decide to participate? This was one of the many
questions — maybe the most important — I asked myself throughout
my research. The answer was furnished by the analysis of the
records and archives of the São Paulo Forum [an informal
organization created in 1990 that gathered leftist political
parties and movements from Latin America and the Caribbean]. I
explain in my book, in great detail, the evolution of the
Haitian question in the Forum’s discussions. Since Haiti was
represented only by the OPL [the Organization of the People in
Struggle] [14] of Gérard-Pierre Charles, when the rupture
between him and [former president] Jean-Bertrand Aristide
occurred in 2000, the Forum aligned itself with Charles and
radically rejected Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas [party]. The
Brazilian Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores do Brasil)
played a crucial role. When Luis Inácio Lula da Silva conquered
the presidency in 2002, he nominated as his diplomatic advisor
the then-Secretary General of the Forum, Marco Aurélio Garcia.
Since then, the Forum’s position on Haiti had become the
Brazilian state’s position. After assuming command of MINUSTAH’s
military branch, Brazil was to make an effort to implement a
multifaceted cooperation plan, as well as to fight — without
success — to make the Peace Operation in Haiti an instrument to
attack the causes, not only the consequences, of the chronic
Haitian political instability.
Today there are whispers — not yet voices —
within the Brazilian state demanding a revision. However, each
Latin American government has its reasons, calculations and
expectations when it comes to their participation in MINUSTAH.
They are selfish calculations based on an alleged national
interest — for example, Brazil hopes to support its claim to
become a permanent member in the U.N. Security Council. As long
as there is not a strong movement of Latin American public
opinion, the governments will continue participating in MINUSTAH.
* This article was originally published
under the title “International Crossroads and Failures in Haiti”
by the LA Progressive. Georgianne Nienaber is a freelance
writer and author and frequent contributor to LA Progressive.
Dan Beeton is International Communications Director at the
Center for Economic and Policy Research and a frequent
contributor to its "Haiti: Relief and Reconstruction Watch"
blog.
Notes
10. Quoted in Agence France Press, November
28, 2010. Accessed January 7, 2014.
11. Haiti’s democratically-elected
president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was flown out of Haiti in 2004
in what he called a “kidnapping in the service of a coup d’etat.”
Chile’s democratically-elected president Salvador Allende
committed suicide in the presidential palace during the
country’s September 11, 1973 coup.
12. See the memoirs of Ginette Chérubin,
Dans le ventre pourri de la bête, Editions de l’Université
d’État d’Haïti, Port-au-Prince, 2014.
13. This is a French expression referring
to a difficult choice.
14. The OPL broke off from the Lavalas
political movement that had originally propelled Aristide into
the presidency in 1991. |
